Media Law Case Studies Essay

1. Whether, as a turn upgrowth of sevens (MP), the charges justifiedly of free name and address in fantan, inclined by sections 3 and 8 of the Houses of fan tan (Privileges and Powers) Ordinance No. 15 of 1952 and denomination 63(2) of the 1957 federal official record, has been validly limited by the resultant amendment made to word 63 with the summing up of clause (4) by the genius (Amendment) knead. 1971 (Act A30).2. Whether the charges just of free mother tongue in fan tan is part of the Constitutions basic structure or a fundamental notice of inborn justice, thus rendering any suppose amendment of the Constitution seeking to limit such repair is void and of no effect. 3. Whether the bring for closure of Chinese and Tamil schools in the process of implementing the national language shag be leg every(prenominal)y and constitutionally do by as forelanding ex constringeion 152(1) and thus, pitch into operation section 3(1) (f) of the confusion Act 19 48 (Revised 1969), despite there not organism a demand for the abolition of breastwork of the teaching or learning of such languages. reasoning1. While divides 3 and 8 of the Houses of Parliament (Privileges and Powers) Ordinance 1952 as tumesce as oblige 63(2) of the Constitution grants an MP independence of speech in Parliament without being held liable to be prosecuted or questi wizardd in court, the subsequent addition of Clause 4 in term 63 states that Clause 2 is not relevant to any person who has committed an offensive under Article 10(4) or the riot Act 1948. Noting that the Acc apply is charged via the tumult Act, it is take place that the Accuseds right of free speech in Parliament is limited by Clause 4 of Article 63.2. The Accuseds right of free speech in Parliament is not instrumental in forming the basic structure of the constitution. Thus, it was deemedunnecessary to decide whether or not any amendments made to state Article will destroy the Constitutions basic structure. In addition, the Accuseds right of free speech is not part of the fundamental rule of natural justice. Therefore, the amendments made to Article 63 the addition of Clause (4) limiting system of macrophages right of free speech in Parliament be valid. 3. It was decided that it would be premature and speculative to conclude this question at the present stage. The answer is deemed to be bound up with uncertain facts of the issue and any proceedings made would be based on assumptions. Counsel was well-advised to forward the submission prepared to the test stress, of whom the slick was further referred to.HeldThe case was wherefore directed to the learned trial Judge for continuation and disposal in conformation with the aforementi oned judgment and otherwise jibe to right.Title and Citation habitual prosecutor v. Param Cumaraswamy1986 1 MLJ 518FactsThe accuse, Vice President of the streak Council Param Cumaraswamy, was charged for committing an offence u nder function 4(1)(b) of the confusion Act 1948 (Revised 1969) for uttering rabble-rousing talking to during a promote conference at the office of the Selangor and Federal Territory close up Committee on 24 July 1985. The accused was making an open address to the Pardons tabular array to reconsider the petition of Sim Kie Chon, who was charged under the Internal security measure Act for possessing an unauthorized forearm, for the commutation of his death sentence.Issues1. Whether the words verbalized by Cumaraswamy ignore be considered inflammatory under part 3 of the Sedition Act. 2. Whether the relation made by Cumaraswamy incited persuasions of ill-will and antipathy amongst the different classes of the Malaysian community under sectionalization 3(1)(e) of the Sedition Act. 3. Whether the statement made by Cumaraswamy incited hate or contempt or get offd alienation against the function under role 3(1)(a).Reasoning1. Uttered words can scarce when be consi dered seditious if they achieve one or more of the instruments specified in contribution 3(1) of the Sedition Act. character 3(1)(d) of the Sedition Act 1948 states that for uttered words to be considered seditious, it must be capable of rearing discontent or disaffection amongst the heap of Malaysia. The press statement was an open appeal to the Pardons get along urging them to exercise their powers uniformly so that the people would not be made to feel that the bill of fare was discriminatory. It was hold by the Court that the words which were used were unlikely to create discontent or disaffection neither among the people nor against the Authority i.e. Yang di-Pertuan Agong, any other Rulers of State and the government.2. Section 3(1)(e) of the Sedition Act defines an act with seditious proclivity that is capable of promotin feeling of ill-will and aggression between different classes of the population of Malaysia. In one part of the press statement, Cumaraswamy pointed out to the Pardons Board that the people should not be made to feel that the Board was bully between the poor, the meek and the unfortunate and the rich, the herculean and the influential. The court agreed that alternatively of trying to promote ill-will and hostility between the different classes of the population, Cumaraswamy was in fact urging the Board not to create the feeling or impression among the population that the Board was discriminating between the different classes.3. Section 3(1)(a) stated that a seditious angle of dip is a tendency to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Ruler or against any Government. It should be noted that Cumaraswamys appeal was directed at the Pardons Board and not at the Ruler i.e. the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Hence, it is seduce that the statement did not carry the tendency to bring upon hatred of disaffection against the Ruler.HeldMr. Cumaraswamy was prime not guilty of sedition. He was afterward acquitted a nd discharged.Title and Citation frequent Prosecutor v. Pung subgenus Chen Choon1994 1 MLJ 566FactsThe accused, Pung Chen Choon, editor of newspaper The Borneo Mail, was charged of maliciously publishing stupid news in The Borneo Mail dated 16 July 1990, stating that genus Benzoin Basintrol, a priest, had been arrested under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA), whereas another priest was on the run from the police and several others were soundless to be on the wanted list. He was charged with an offence under Section 8A(1) of the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 (PPPA). He was prosecuted in the Magistrates Court in Kota Kinabalu. A fewer issues were raised, leading to the case being forwarded to the soaring Court and subsequently, to the Supreme Court.IssuesThe following issues of law were presented to the Supreme Court for determination 1. Whether Section 8A(1) of PPPA, when read with Section 8A(2), restricts the right to granting immunity of speech and expression g ranted by Article 10(1)(a) of the Constitution. 2. If so, whether the restriction imposed is one permitted by or under Article 10(2)(a) of the Constitution. 3. Whether Section 8A(1) of PPPA, read with Section 8A(2), is concordant with Article 10(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Constitution and therefore, valid. 4. Whether Section 8A(2) of PPPA, by presuming that false news by itself is malicious, amounts to pre-censorship and therefore, disregards Article 10(1)(a) and (2) of the Constitution.Reasoning1. The Malaysian Constitution, unlike the graduation exercise Amendment to the Constitution of the USA, does not directly addresses emancipation of press. However, judicial opinion in India regarding Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution, which grants all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression, has established that freedom of press is included within its domain. In regards to that, it is clear that Section 8A(1) of the PPPA does restrict the right to freedom of speech and expression granted by Article 10(1)(a) of the Constitution.2 & 3. Although not all false news, even if maliciously published, travel within the stated restrictions in Article 10(2)(a), it is possible that the malicious publication of false news could incite acts which jeopardize the inherent security of the country, undermine Malaysias couthie relations with other countries, lead to intervention of publicorder, and incite the commission of offences. Hence, it can be said that Section 8A of PPPA falls within the orbit of permitted restrictions in Article 10(2)(a) of the Constitution and is constitutionally valid.4. Section 8A(2) of PPPA is and a statutory presumption which operates at the trial stage, arising only if the prosecution are able to prove when prosecuting the accused in court that the news published is false. Section 8A(2) is, in no way, equated with pre-censorship, which can only take place before publication. Moreover, Section 8A(2) does not restrict freedom of press either directly or indirectly. Hence, the answer to Question 4 is no. HeldThe case was forwarded to the magistrate to proceed with the hearing, taking into account the answers to the questions presented, to discipline whether the offence charged has been ascertained by the prosecution beyond all sound doubt.ReferencesMark Koding v. Public Prosecutor 1982 2 MLJ 120Public Prosecutor v. Param Cumaraswamy 1986 1 MLJ 512Public Prosecutor v. Param Cumaraswamy (No. 2) 1986 1 MLJ 518 Public Prosecutor v. Pung Chen Choon 1994 1 MLJ 566